The Android operating system powers the majority of the world's mobile devices and has been becoming increasingly important in day-to-day digital forensics. Therefore, technicians and analysts are in need of reliable methods for extracting and analyzing memory images from live Android systems. This paper takes different existing, extraction methods and derives a universal, reproducible, reliably documented method for both extraction and analysis. In addition the VOLIX II front-end for the Volatility Framework is extended with additional functionality to make the analysis of Android memory images easier for technically non-adept users.
INTRODUCTION
Extraction of information from smartphones is becoming progressively more important as the ubiquity of mobile devices, such as smartphones and tablets, increases ever further. Law enforcement agencies, technicians and even end users are in need of reliable methods for extracting data from mobile devices when extraction of data from nonvolatile memory is not possible or insufficient. One possible source for data is the RAM (Random Access Memory) of such devices.
Possible scenarios for the analysis of RAM extracted from an Android device include typical law enforcement situations, such as the forensic analysis of devices seized during the course of investigations, as well as situations often encountered by IT support technicians, such as a first response analysis of a malware infestation. The potential applications are similar to those of live memory analysis for traditional desktop (Windows, Mac, or Linux) systems and are important due to the sheer amount of personal information stored on a smartphone or tablet.
Android is, in essence, a Linux-based system (Begun, 2011) . It runs a Linux kernel, generally compiled for the mobile processors usually found in smartphones, tablets and other low-power devices. The lion's share of mobile processing for Android devices takes place on the ARM microprocessor architecture, which necessitates cross-compilation of any native code for use on these devices.
The common core with modern Linux distributions ensures the existence of software tools for extraction and analysis of Android memory images, such as the LiME (Linux Memory Extractor) kernel module (Sylve, 2015) and the Volatility Framework for analysis of memory images from multiple operating systems (Hale, 2013a) . This paper describes the leverage of the aforementioned tools LiME and Volatility resulting in a reproducible, reliable approach for the extraction and analysis of memory images from Android devices.
TECHNICAL CHALLENGES PRESENTED BY ANDROID
The Android operating system, while based on a Linux core, presents multiple new challenges for forensic analysis when compared to traditional desktop operating systems. The analysis of data stored in RAM on a target device can be very beneficial in addressing these problems. After the user has activated FDE, the device automatically encrypts internal storage devices using 128-bit AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) with cipher-block chaining (CBC) and an ESSIV (Encrypted salt-sector initialization vector) using SHA256. Starting from Android 5.0, this encryption can optionally be limited to the data partition in order to reduce performance penalties during the boot process (Android Open Source Project). RAM, on the other hand, is generally not encrypted, as this is ill-advised from a performance standpoint. Therefore, if the data from an encrypted device's RAM were available, it would likely be possible to ascertain the encryption type and parameters of both standard and user-implemented encryption methods (such as LUKS). In some cases it may even be possible to circumvent encryption measures and decrypt the data on the device's encrypted volumes by obtaining the decryption key from within RAM.
Proofs of concept for the decryption of Android devices with storage encrypted by both dm-crypt (Elatov, 2015) , the default device encryption solution used by Android starting from version 4.0, and LUKS have been published (Elatov, 2015; Müller and Spreitzenbarth, 2013) . Both proofs of concept hinge upon the extraction of encryption parameters from a running device's RAM.
Locker/Vault Apps
The second challenge presented by Android is the ubiquity of locker/vault type apps (short: locker apps), which offer password-secured protection of sensitive data placed within them. These apps, ranging from simple and easy to circumvent to absolute state-of-the-art, are easily available from the Google Play Store or as downloadable APK files for manual installation (Begun, 2011) In addition, ADB and terminal emulators make it easy for advanced users to script their own security measures for sensitive data to be stored on the phone.
Similarly to attacks on FDE, analysis of RAM from devices running Android locker apps can provide valuable information as to the type and parameters of data protection methods used. In many cases, due to the simplicity of the methods used and an unhealthy reliance on security through obscurity, extracting data protected by locker apps is a simple matter of knowing where to look. The locker app's data in RAM often provides hints as to locations of files hidden by the app.
Android Malware
For support technicians and first responders, malware represents an additional problem in the Android ecosystem. Due to the sandboxing of Android applications (i.e., by the Dalvik VM used by Android for running its Java-based apps (Android Developers)) it is difficult to build malware scanning and protection apps which are able to analyze running code as well as any data apps may write to the device's internal storage.
Analysis of RAM from devices infected with malware can aid in detection, identification and even determining the origin of certain malware.
EXTRACTION OF MEMORY IMAGES
Multiple well-documented approaches for the extraction of memory images from Linux system exist (Caban, 2014) . However, these approaches all present additional challenges when confronted with an Android system. This has led to large levels of fragmentation of the Android software ecosystem, due to nearly every device running its own custom compiled version of the Android kernel. Even two kernels with the same version number may not be alike due to custom compile flags used by the manufacturer to enable or disable functions and tweak the kernel towards the System on a Chip (SoC) and other hardware components in the device for performance and efficiency reasons.
Android Kernel Version Fragmentation

Loadable Kernel Modules for Memory Extraction
Most Linux memory extraction strategies, including the approach presented here, are implemented through the use of LKMs (Loadable Kernel Modules (Caban, 2014) ). The extraction of RAM from a Linux system requires compilation of an LKM specifically for the device in question. The LKM version number needs to match the kernel version number, the toolchain and compiler used to create the LKM need to be compatible with those used to compile the kernel, and the running kernel's source code is required for compilation of the LKM. On desktop Linux systems, this is generally not an issue -one would simply install the same distribution, running the same kernel, on separate hardware, and then use that system to compile an LKM (Tilbury, 2013) . Using the same distribution and kernel version as the target device makes compilation simple and generally rules out any compatibility issues. If a compromise in the level of forensic purity on the target system is acceptable, it is also possible to compile the LKM directly on the target system, ensuring compatibility. Tools which implement this for desktop systems automatically already exist -a prime example1 is Linux Memory Grabber by Hal Pomeranz (Hale, 2013b; Pomeranz, 2014) .
Unfortunately, due to hardware constraints as well as a lack of software tools for the compilation process, this is not possible on Android devices.
Instead, when compiling an LKM for Android, compilation takes place on a separate system running a desktop Linux operating system. The compiler uses a cross compilation toolchain for CPU architecture compatibility (Hale, 2013a) . Due to the availability of multiple toolchains and multiple compilers, the possibility of building incompatible LKMs exists. In general, using the toolchain and compiler used for compilation of the running device's kernel will likely lead to a working kernel module.
Multiple LKMs for the extraction of memory images are available, including fmem, pmem and LiME. In most cases, these LKMs work by creating a device such as /dev/fmem as a parsable entry point for memory extraction (Hale, 2013b) .
General LKM Compilation Process for Android Devices
Summarily, the compilation process consists of the following steps: 1. Initialization of the build environment: This step consists of the installation of prerequisites such as the required Java version and various libraries required for the Android build process, as well as the setting of required environment variables. ADB (Android Debug Bridge) access to devices via USB from within a Linux system also requires additional steps. 2. Procurement of a toolchain, such as the linuxarm-androideabi-toolchain included in the Android NDK. 3. Procurement of the target device's kernel source code. 4. Procurement of the LKM source code 5. Editing the Makefile included in the LKM source code to compile against the target device's kernel source code and use the correct toolchain 6. Issuing the make command
Linux Memory Extractor Lkm
LiME (Linux Memory Extractor) is a loadable kernel module used to extract memory from Linux-based systems. It has previously been used to successfully extract the contents of RAM from Android devices and generates memory dumps compatible with the Volatility Framework (Sylve, 2011) . LiME was chosen as extraction tool due to the fact that it represents the most viable approach for Android devices. LiME is a well-documented project which is well-known to the developers of the Volatility Framework and hence provides a good starting point for the extraction of Android RAM images (Hale, 2013a) .
During the course of this work, LiME was successfully used to extract memory dumps from both simulated and physical Android devices running Android versions up to 5.1 (Android Lollipop second release).
Extracting Memory with Lime
The use of LiME in order to extract memory from Android devices is much simpler than the compilation of the corresponding kernel module.
First, the LKM, in form of a .ko file, is copied to the device's internal memory or SD card. Then, from a terminal emulator app or an active ADB connection, the user executes the insmod command to inject the LKM into the running kernel and extract the device's memory to either a local file or over TCP. An example insmod command is the following:
insmod /sdcard/lime.ko "path=/sdcard/lime.dump format=lime"
Here the lime.ko LiME LKM file was placed on the device's internal memory (due to historical reasons, the mount point /sdcard/ is used for the useraccessible part of the internal memory on Android devices). The additional parameters path and format determine the location of the newly generated memory image and its structure, respectively (Sylve, 2015) .
The process of dumping memory can take anywhere between a few seconds and multiple minutes, depending on the size of the device's RAM and the speed of the storage device being written to. After the memory dump has been generated, it can be transferred to the forensic workstation for analysis.
ANALYSIS OF PREVIOUSLY EXTRACTED MEMORY IMAGES
The analysis of memory images using Volatility requires a Volatility profile. The profile contains information about both the memory image as well as the system the image was extracted from. This includes information about the location of kernel debug symbols and the kernel's data structures (Hale, 2013b) . The Volatility Framework includes several precompiled profiles for popular operating systems (Linux Profiles, 2012) However, these are mostly limited to common major versions of Windows. The Volatility foundation also provides several optional profiles for Mac and Linux systems, available for download and manual installation. These optional profiles come in the form of a ZIP archive containing a precompiled Dwarfdump file, which contains the kernel data structure information, and the system.map file, which contains the kernel debug symbol information. The list of available profiles is small, including only a small number of the available Linux distributions and only a limited subset of each distribution's recent releases (Linux Profiles, 2012) .
Precompiled profiles for Android devices may be listed in the future. However, the fragmentation of the Android software ecosystem will likely necessitate the custom compilation of a profile for each target device due to the sheer amount of possible combinations. The 10 most popular Android devices alone each run multiple different kernel versions over the course of multiple manufacturer updates, already offering up an incredible number of permutations.
Generating a Volatility Profile
Generating the Volatility profile requires the compilation of a module against the target device's kernel source to create the vtypes (kernel data structures). The Makefile included in the Volatility framework uses DwarfDump to pack the vtypes in a format which is readable by Volatility, generating a module.dwarf file (Hale, 2013b ).
The resulting file is then packed in a ZIP archive together with the target device kernel's system.map file (Sylve, 2015) . For Android devices the system.map is generally supplied along with the kernel source code, or can be manually assembled from information extracted from /proc/kallsyms/ using a cat command. The latter requires advanced knowledge of Linux kernel structures.
The following steps are necessary to generate a Volatility profile for an Android target device:
1. Procurement of the Volatility source code 2. Editing the included Makefile to use the target device's kernel source code as well as the correct toolchain for cross compilation 3. Issuing the make command 4. Procurement of the system.map file 5. Adding both the module.dwarf file generated by make and the system.map file to a ZIP archive
The newly created ZIP file can then either be placed in the volatility/plugins/overlays/linux directory of the Volatility package root directory or referenced via the -plugins flag during execution of Volatility from the command line (Raman, 2014) .
Using Volatility to Analyze Android Memory Images
The Volatility framework is a simple command-line based tool. The plugins to be run are passed as parameters, i.e.:
This command analyzes a memory image (lime.dump) using the linux_pslist plugin and outputs the generated list of running processes to a text file (results_pslist.txt).
Some plugins, such as linux_volshell, require additional parameters and input from the user.
THE VOLIX II VOLATILITY FRONTEND
In essence, the Volatility framework consists of a collection of Python scripts which are executed from the command line using a compatible version of the Python (a high-level object-oriented programming language with an on-the-fly interpreter) software package. The Volatility Foundation also provides standalone executable versions of Volatility for Windows, which are also run from the command line.
In an effort to simplify the operation of the Volatility framework, especially for less experienced users, the VOLIX Volatility frontend was developed (Logen et al., 2012) . The latest version VOLIX II is built with a standard Windows Forms GUI, which should be familiar to most users of standard Windows software (VOLIX II, 2014).
As part of this work, the software of VOLIX II was extended to include functions pertaining to the analysis of Android memory images, as well as making the analysis of general Linux memory images simpler and more accessible to novice users. Changes include the addition of a Volatility profile selection mechanism for Linux and Android, additional Android-specific automated extraction routines for common tasks and an overhaul of the English language interface.
The user supplies the extracted memory image from the target device along with the Volatility profile. VOLIX II can then be used for execution of specific Volatility commands from within the GUI, or to execute automatic routines such as finding hidden processes or installed locker apps.
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR PHYSICAL ANDROID DEVICES
Due to the nature of the extraction methods presented here, target devices must fulfill certain prerequisites in order to be considered for successful extraction of an accurate memory image. First and foremost, the injection of a kernel module such as LiME requires root access to the device. This means that unless the device has already been rooted for general use by its owner, the forensic investigator needs to find a viable root method and execute it on the device (Sylve, 2011) .
Second, access to a console/command line is necessary for execution of the insmod command. There are two possible ways to access a command line: An ADB session or an app installed on the device (such as a terminal emulator or a remote command line app e.g. SSH server or similar).
Being able to open an ADB session requires either a USB or WiFi connection to the target device, the former of which is generally trivial unless there is physical damage to the device's USB port. However, in order to successfully connect to the device via ADB, the device must be set up to allow ADB connections in the developer options. In addition, recent Android versions have an ADB fingerprinting feature which requires the manual authorization of the connected PC on the target device itself.
Third, the injection of kernel modules via insmod requires that the kernel be configured to load modules at runtime. This requires three specific compilation flags (Hale, 2013b) :
These flags are enabled by default for kernels running on many developer systems, as well as those included in many custom ROMs for Android devices. This is not the norm, however, for factory standard devices sold to the general public.
Ideally, a target device would be previously rooted, have an insmod-friendly kernel configuration, and be unlocked for ADB connections from new PCs. In the real world, this is generally not the case. In order to root the device and allow ADB connections from a workstation, the forensic investigator must first gain access to the physical device, bypassing the device's PIN or pattern lock. Modifying the kernel to allow the injection of kernel modules generally requires a reboot, which may compromise system integrity (Ligh et al., 2014) .
FORENSIC CONSIDERATIONS
Due to the nature of the extraction approach put forward here, a certain measure of forensic contamination of the target system is inevitable. Most devices encountered in the wild will not correspond to the ideal scenario introduced in Section 6, meaning they will need to be modified (root access, kernel modification, command line access) in order to extract memory images.
These modifications, in some cases, require a reboot of the system. This makes it difficult to preserve the exact memory state of the Android device for extraction and may lead to loss of useful data. Running applications and open files relevant to the investigation may not automatically run/open again after a reboot, and many caches and temporary files are purged during boot.
When applying the methods presented here, it is important to keep in mind that any extracted data may be incomplete and/or inaccurate.
In many cases, though, these shortcomings are irrelevant. Many Android applications start automatically at launch, as is the case for a lot of malware applications such as malicious RAT (Remote Administration Tool) apps. 
EXTRACTION AND ANALYSIS OF MEMORY IMAGES FROM ANDROID DEVICES
Android 5.1 Android Virtual Device
Building the LiME LKM, a Volatility profile and a compatible kernel for the standard version of Android 5.1 running on the AVD emulator is a straightforward affair. The kernel source code for the Android 5.1 version running on the emulator is easily obtainable directly from Google's code repository, and the Android system images included with the Android SDK (which contains the AVD emulator) are highly compatible with the arm-linux-androideabitoolchains included in the Android NDK. Cross-compilation of the LiME LKM required only small modifications to the Makefile included in the LiME source code, such as modification of the path to the Android NDK arm-linux-androideabitoolchain and the path to the previously downloaded Android kernel source code.
Compilation of a kernel with the compilation flags needed for the use of insmod required the generation of a .config kernel configuration file using make goldfish_armv7_defconfig. The flags were then added to the kernel configuration file by hand before the kernel was compiled.
Generation of the Volatility profile for the Android 5.1 AVD was similarly simple, as was extraction using insmod, due to AVD system images providing root access by default.
After a successful extraction and transfer of the memory image to a forensic workstation via adb pull, the Volatility framework was successfully used to extract data from the image. Plugins used to extract data include linux_pslist, which provides a list of processes running at the time of extraction, linux_dmesg, which outputs the kernel message buffer, and linux_lsof, which lists open files at the time of extraction (cf. figure 2).
Samsung Galaxy Nexus
Both compilation of the LiME LKM and generation of the Volatility profile for Android 4.3 and 4.4 on the Galaxy Nexus proved more difficult.
CyanogenMod 11 (Android 4.4)
The first attempt to extract memory from this device was made using a nightly build of the CyanogenMod 11 custom ROM (based on Android 4.4), due to the fact that these systems present an easy target for the extraction methods detailed here. They offer enabled USB debugging (which means the device is ready for ADB connections), the ability to inject kernel modules and root access by default (see 6). Two problems were encountered during this approach: 1. The use of a nonstandard toolchain to build CyanogenMod and 2. the fact that CyanogenMod strips its kernel debug symbols to save space. The toolchain problem was solved by switching to a toolchain included in the CyanogenMod source code for full compatibility with the CyanogenMod custom ROM, enabling the successful extraction of a memory image from the Galaxy Nexus.
Obtaining the kernel debug symbols for the Volatility profile was possible only by using cat to extract a list of debug symbols from /proc/kallsyms on the running system. After modification of the extracted list before integrating it in a Volatility profile, only rudimentary analysis of the extracted memory image proved possible.
Due to missing debug symbols, many important Volatility plugins, such as linux_pslist or linux_dmesg would output only empty files or a short string unrelated to the usual output of these plugins. Other plugins, such as linux_check_syscall, run without issue (cf. figure 3 ).
Galaxy Nexus Factory Image (Android 4.3)
In a more standard approach, the extraction and analysis method was also tested on the Galaxy Nexus running the standard Android 4.3 factory image. In this case, recompilation of the kernel with the compilation flags necessary for injection of kernel modules was required, but was otherwise straightforward. Similar to the approach for the Google AVD emulator, the kernel source code for the Galaxy Nexus factory image is readily available, as the Galaxy Nexus was part of the Google Nexus developer device program. For this reason, the Galaxy Nexus factory image is also highly compatible with the toolchains supplied by Google's NDK. Cross-compilation of the LiME LKM as well as the module.dwarf file for the Volatility profile were completed without any problems. Extraction of the memory image from the device additionally required gaining root access on the device, which was accomplished using the Nexus Root Toolkit.
After the successful extraction of the memory image and transfer to the forensic workstation via ADB, analysis of the image with Volatility proved successful, allowing the recovery of information with most of the Linux plugins included with Volatility.
Google (LG) Nexus 5
The Nexus 5 is part of Google's current Nexus lineup of developer smartphones (soon to be replaced by a successor known as the Nexus 5 2015), and has, at time of publication, received an update to the latest Android release: Lollipop 5.1.1.
Like the Galaxy Nexus, it runs a standard factory image. Hence, cross-compilation of the LiME LKM as well as creation of the corresponding Volatility profile were straightforward and analogous to the process for the Google AVD emulator. Gaining root access was also possible using the same Nexus Root Toolkit used for the Galaxy Nexus.
After successful extraction of the memory image from the Nexus 5 device and transfer to the forensic workstation via adb pull over a USB connection, nearly all of the Volatility framework's Linux plugins were found to be useable, even with this very latest version of Android.
Simplifying Memory Extraction and Analysis
Successful extraction of a memory image using the LKM approach, as well as subsequent analysis using the Volatility Framework, depends on a number of factors which may vary according to the manufacturer, the version of the installed operating system, user settings, and the device's security and root status.
While the extraction and analysis of memory images from standard developer devices such as the Google Nexus series or the Google AVD Emulator follows a standard, documented routine, extracting and analyzing memory from any of the myriad available consumer devices requires a more specialized approach with time-consuming experimentation.
LKM and Volatility Profile Repository
At the lowest level, it is the generation of the LKM as well as the Volatility profile that differs from device to device. Since both the LKM and the Volatility profile only need to be generated once for a given device running a given Android version, a repository of kernel modules and ready-to-use Volatility profiles could greatly simplify the extraction of memory images from popular devices.
While the creation of a repository would require physical access to all the devices in question and, in some cases, multiple hours of work per device, crowdsourcing the modules and profiles is a possibility.
The Volatility Foundation already provides a basic set of Linux and Mac OS profiles for use with the Volatility Framework on Github at https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/profiles. This repository could be extended to include profiles for Android devices, preferably bundled with the corresponding LiME kernel modules. The kernel modules and profiles generated for the purposes of this research will be submitted shortly. The availability of a LKM and Volatility profile for a given device would not guarantee a successful extraction -it would, however, greatly accelerate the process.
Different Versions of Android on the Same Device
While the generation of the LKM and the Volatility profile is a process that differs greatly from device to device, the process is generally very similar when the device is the same, but a different Android version is used. In many cases, the only difference is the kernel source code that the LKM and Volatility profile vTypes are compiled against -simply replacing the source code directory with the appropriate version for the kernel now running on the device is often sufficient to generate a working LKM and Volatility profile.
In part, this is due to the significant changes manufacturers make to the kernels shipped on their devices (which generally do not change as heavily when the OS version is simply upgraded), but also simply due to differing kernel source code folder structures and incompatbile cross-compilation toolchains.
MALWARE ANALYSIS USING MEMORY IMAGES
The Linux plugins for the Volatility Framework provide multiple possible methods for the detection and analysis of malware in Android memory images. These range from the simple detection of a running process known to be associated with malware (using linux_pslist, for instance) to more complex methods such as using linux_yarascan for pattern matching malware detection (Luttgens et al., 2014) , as well as ways to ascertain the addresses of remote communication servers if in use.
Well known Android malware such as the Remote Administration tool AndroRAT, for instance, was easy to detect running in memory even with the simplest detection routines, showing up in linux_pslist without any attempt at hiding itself (cf. figure 4) While it is relatively simple for a malware developer to hide a malware application from the Android task switcher or DDMS (Dalvik Debug Monitor Service), hiding the application process so that it is not detectable in pslist is very difficult. Therefore, many malware apps rely on simple security by obscurity to avoid detection -such as the process name chosen by the developers of AndroRAT as seen in Figure 5 . After detection, it may be useful to ascertain the servers and/or nodes the malware communicated with -this can be achieved by reading the data in the routing table cache using linux_route_cache (Pryor, 2013) . The routing table cache can contain a record of systems a Linux machine has communicated with in the past:
If the malware was transmitting at the time the memory image was extracted, it may also be useful to extract packets stored in the send and receive queues at the time of extraction. This can be achieved using linux_pkt_queues, which recovers packets from the queues and can save them directly to disk (Pryor, 2013) .
Additionally, linux_sk_buff_cache can be used to recover and save packets which were in kernel memory at the time of extraction, but is currently incompatible with SLUB (Unqueued Slab Allocator -a memory management mechanism which allows the retention of certain allocated data objects for later reuse (Cinar, 2015) ), the current default allocator in Linux since kernel 2.6.23 (Case, 2012) .
Last but not least, the Volatility framework also provides Linux plugins which allow the detection of active rootkits, such as linux_check_creds, which can detect rootkits piggypacking on the credentials of processes with root privileges (often PID 1), linux_check_idt, which lists the addresses and symbols contained within the IDT (Interrupt Descriptor Table) , including those hooked by rootkits, and linux_check_syscall, which lists the system call tables and checks them for functions hooked by rootkits (Linux Profiles, 2012) .
Rootkits may also inject kernel modules which are hidden in the loaded module list (as called by lsmod). The Volatility plugin linux_check_modules can detect these modules, as long as they are still present under /sys/modules/ (Pryor, 2013) .
CONCLUSION
The extraction and analysis of RAM images from Android devices remains a relatively young field. While possibilities for both extraction and analysis exist for a multitude of Android device and software constellations, the application of the currently known and documented methods generally require extensive knowledge of both Linux systems and the use of Make for the compilation of kernel modules. In addition, many of the existing approaches are documented only for specific devices running specific versions of Android, making it difficult to apply them to other devices which a forensic investigator may encounter during investigations.
The methods described here provide a universal approach for the extraction of RAM images from Android devices, as well as the generation of a corresponding Volatility profile for subsequent analysis using the Volatility framework. In addition, the extension of the VOLIX II Volatility frontend for Android memory images greatly simplifies the analysis of these memory images with the previously generated Volatility profiles.
In the future, automatic (scripted) generation of LiME LKMs and Volatility profiles for a given device would greatly simplify the process of memory extraction and analysis. This could, for instance, be achieved via distribution of a Linux VM (virtual machine) containing the required scripts, to be launched on the investigator's forensic workstation.
With a target device that fulfills the requirements set forth in section 6, the investigator would need to supply only the source code for the kernel running on the device and quickly be able to compile a working LiME LKM for the device, as well as generate a Volatility profile for memory extracted from the device with the LKM.
A cleaner forensic approach for memory extraction from Android devices, free from the limitations shown in section 7, would require a completely new approach which does not hinge upon the injection of a kernel module. This would, however, require the discovery of a vulnerability in Android which can be triggered without modification of the running system. Even if such a vulnerability were located, it would only be a matter of time until Android was patched to remove the vulnerability.
